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Abstract
People vicariously experience embarrassment when observing others’ public pratfalls or etiquette violations. In two
consecutive studies we investigated the subjective experience and the neural correlates of vicarious embarrassment for
others in a broad range of situations. We demonstrated, first, that vicarious embarrassment was experienced regardless of
whether the observed protagonist acted accidentally or intentionally and was aware or unaware that he/she was in an
embarrassing situation. Second, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we showed that the anterior cingulate
cortex and the left anterior insula, two cortical structures typically involved in vicarious feelings of others’ pain, are also
strongly implicated in experiencing the ‘social pain’ for others’ flaws and pratfalls. This holds true even for situations that
engage protagonists not aware of their current predicament. Importantly, the activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and
the left anterior insula positively correlated with individual differences in trait empathy. The present findings establish the
empathic process as a fundamental prerequisite for vicarious embarrassment experiences, thus connecting affect and
cognition to interpersonal processes. ‘‘When we are living with people who have a delicate sense of propriety, we are in
misery on their account when anything unbecoming is committed. So I always feel for and with Charlotte when a person is
tipping his chair. She cannot endure it.’’ [Elective Affinities, J. W. Goethe].
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Introduction
Imagine the following anecdotal situation: You are attending a
conference. While sitting within a fully occupied audience you
observe the presenter walking down the aisle with toilet paper
clinging to his back pocket. Before you could take charge of the
situation and make the presenter aware of the unwanted attention
from everybody, you would be sure to imagine what others must
think of him and what the source of giggling or averting the gaze
would be. The presenter, on the other hand, would walk to the
podium, unaware of why everybody is secretly looking at his
backside. Despite the presenter’s unspecific emotional state,
surrounding bystanders experience strong emotions – vicariously.
It is these vicariously experienced emotions and their neural
underpinnings in response to intentionally or accidentally caused
public shortcomings, pratfalls, or norm violations of others that are
the focus of the present research.
Social emotions such as embarrassment, guilt, pride, or
shame represent key elements of our human moral apparatus.
They have been distinguished from basic emotions (fear,
happiness, etc.) in various ways [1]. Recent conceptualizations
suggest that embarrassment is a transient reaction to a violation
of social etiquette that endangers one’s particular public image
and can be evoked in different situations. Examples include
physical pratfalls (e.g., slipping in the mud), cognitive short-
comings, loss of control over the body, shortcomings in physical
appearance (e.g., zipper open), or failure at privacy regulation
[1,2,3].
Returning to the above anecdote, embarrassment is also
experienced vicariously. Research shows that vicarious embar-
rassment is evoked even without any connection between the
observer and the protagonist’s predicament and without any
responsibility of the observer for the protagonist’s situation [4,5,6].
In his classic work Miller [4] hypothesized that maintaining face in
social interactions is of such central concern that envisioning
oneself in the place of an embarrassed other might cause one to
suffer empathic embarrassment (p. 9).
Neural Correlates of Empathy for Others’ Pain
To date, research on the neural correlates of empathic processes
has primarily focused on the empathic processing of others’
physical pain. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
studies report that affective-motivational components of the so
called ‘pain matrix’ [7,8,9], the anterior insula and the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC), are most reliably involved in the
compassionate feeling of pain [10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17]. Further,
subjective reports on the experienced pain as well as participants’
estimates of the intensity of observed pain were positively
associated with the hemodynamic responses in these regions
[12,16,18]. More recently, an fMRI study extended these findings
and demonstrated that compassion for both physical (i.e. injury)
and social pain (i.e. social rejection) are processed in the anterior
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 April 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 4 | e18675insula [19]. Based on these studies, the ACC and the anterior
insula have been regarded as core regions involved in empathically
processing the emotions of others and generating inner states of
another person’s feelings [20].
While concentrating on basic emotions, social neuroscience has
not yet focused on the neural correlates of vicarious embarrass-
ment experienced for others’ flaws. However, some fMRI studies
have investigated related concepts, such as the first-person
experience of embarrassment [21] or the impact of intentional
and accidental norm violations on inferred emotions using written
vignettes [22,23]. These studies asked participants to infer their
own emotions imagining being the protagonist or estimating the
emotion of the protagonist, respectively. These studies are thus
limited in understanding the processes involved in vicarious
embarrassment experiences.In line with the model of Miller
(1987), we hypothesize that empathy processes provide the
foundation to understand the complex emotion of vicarious
embarrassment and postulate that individual differences in
empathy modulate the embarrassment individuals experience for
others’ predicaments. Therefore, the observation of vicariously
embarrassing situations should not only stimulate brain regions
typically involved in empathic processes, but moreover individual
differences in trait empathy should correlate with these neural
activations.
Modeling Intention Attribution and Perspective Taking in
Vicarious Embarrassment
Previously used experimental procedures limit the examination
of vicarious embarrassment experiences to situations that engage
protagonists who are aware about their current transgression [6].
To better approximate the broader variety of situations that make
observers experience vicarious embarrassment we propose a
different approach in examining this social emotion. As for the
first-person experience of embarrassment, an essential require-
ment for vicarious embarrassment is that the observed protagonist
violates normative social standards or etiquettes. In contrast to the
first-person experience of embarrassment, however, the norm-
violating nature of the behavior does not need to be accessible to
the protagonist; it is the observer who needs to be aware of it.
Extending Miller’s (1987) work, we postulate that it is an empathic
process and, accordingly, the capability to represent other people’s
inner states that enables observers to experience vicarious
embarrassment. However, when observers perceive somebody as
violating a social etiquette in a public situation, they may not only
put their self into the ‘mental shoes’ of the observed protagonist,
his/her intentions and feelings, but also take into account their
external view on normative and social standards in the particular
context [24]. This process is far from perfect and rather egocentric
than focused merely on the feelings of the observed person [25],
and may account for situations that evoke vicarious embarrass-
ment in observers even when the fact of the norm violating
incident is not accessible to the observed protagonist himself/
herself.
Drawing on research on the (non-vicarious) experience of
embarrassment [2,26], we further suggest that the attributed
intentional or accidental character of a norm violation is crucial to
the experience of vicarious embarrassment. Accidental mishaps do
not necessarily reflect on one’s personal character or flawed
aspects of the self because the behavior can well be caused by
external, situational factors. In contrast, attribution of intention-
ality to the protagonist’s misbehavior directly reflects on his/her
character. Here, the protagonist has control about his/her action
and, accordingly, can be made responsible for his/her behavior.
This distinction seems to be implicitly present in the existing
empirical studies on vicarious embarrassment; however, it has not
yet been integrated into a conceptualization of situations eliciting
vicarious embarrassment.
The above considerations led us to organize situations in which
vicarious embarrassment may occur along two dimensions. The
dimension of ‘‘intentionality’’ represents the accidental versus
intentional character of the embarrassing situation. The dimension
of ‘‘awareness’’ refers to the accessibility of the norm violation to the
observed protagonist. The dimensions are thought to be
conceptually orthogonal, so their combination results in four
distinctive classes of situations in which observers may experience
vicarious embarrassment, abbreviated in the following as (i) AA
(accidental > aware); (ii) AU (accidental > unaware); (iii) IA
(intentional > aware) and (iv) IU (intentional > unaware).
Overview of the Present Studies
The present research aims to elucidate the phenomenon of
vicarious embarrassment, its link to individual differences in trait
empathy, and the underlying neuro-cognitive processes. In two
pilot studies, we constructed and validated stimulus situations to
elicit vicarious embarrassment representing the hypothesized
dimensions of ‘‘intentionality’’ and ‘‘awareness’’ (see File S1). In
Study 1, we showed that vicarious embarrassment is experienced
independently of the experience of first-person embarrassment and
that vicarious embarrassment is related to individual differences in
trait empathy. In Study 2, we used functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) to transfer this modulation of individual
differences in trait empathy to the level of neural activations
during the processing of vicariously embarrassing situations. We
discuss these findings in the light of contemporary research on
empathy for physical pain.
Study 1: Relation of Vicarious Embarrassment to
First-Person Embarrassment and Individual
Differences in Empathy
First, we expected that vicarious embarrassment experiences
would differ in their experience from the first-person embarrass-
ment as attributed to an observed person in a specific situation. On
the one hand, as previous research suggests, vicarious embarrass-
ment may depend on the observation of embarrassment in others.
These situations are characterized by a protagonist accidentally
being exposed in a public predicament that he/she is aware of. On
the other hand, as suggested above, for a broad range of other
situations we expect that vicarious embarrassment is independent
of the perception of embarrassment in others. These situations
comprise others’ intentional norm violations or the protagonists
being unaware about the embarrassing incident. Second, we
examined the role of individual differences in trait empathy in
experiencing vicarious embarrassment. With processes of perspec-
tive taking considered at the core of this emotional reaction [4], we
assumed that trait empathy would be positively related to the self-
reported experience of vicarious embarrassment.
Methods
Ethics Statement. We confirm that the research has been
conducted in compliance with the appropriate ethical guidelines of
the American Psychological Association (APA). The study was
approved by the local ethics committee at the faculty of medicine,
Philipps-University Marburg. All subjects were written informed
about the background of the study and anonymity of data
collection. We confirm that we obtained informed written consent
from all participants involved in the study.
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men, all German speaking, with a mean age of 23.79 (SD=3.66)
years. A majority of 534 participants (86.3%) were undergraduate
students, 37 (6.0%) indicated they were unemployed, 32 (5.2%)
worked or received professional training, and 14 were pupils
(2.3%). Twelve participants did not specify their educational or
professional status.
Materials and Procedure. Fifty-two previously selected
vignettes modeling the four different situations (see File S1) were
used in an online questionnaire (www.limesurvey.org; version
1.72). All participants started with the questionnaire (including two
exemplary vignettes in the introduction) asking to evaluate the
embarrassment reaction for each of the 52 vignettes as they
thought the observed acting person would experience at that
specific moment: ‘‘Imagine yourself observing the following situation. What
do you think: Is the person feeling embarrassed at that specific moment? If
yes, how intense is this feeling?’’ The relevant protagonist was
highlighted in bold. After this, participants received the vicarious
embarrassment instruction and rated their vicarious
embarrassment experiences for each of the situation vignettes.
The instructions were similar to those in the pilot studies: ‘‘Imagine
you are observing the person in the situation. Are you feeling embarrassed for
this person? If yes, how intense is this feeling?’’. Responses were given on
scales ranging from 1 (not at all)t o7( very strong). The relevant
protagonist was highlighted in bold to clarify the perspective the
participants were asked to take. The order of block presentation
(i.e. first embarrassment then vicarious embarrassment) was
chosen to minimize effects that vicarious embarrassment ratings
could exert on embarrassment ratings. The stimulus material
varied regarding the underlying dimensions of ‘‘intentionality’’ and
‘‘awareness’’ and clustered into four distinctive categories. Eleven
neutral situations displaying appropriate behavior complemented
the set of stimuli.
Accidental > Aware (AA, 11 vignettes). The predicament
occurs accidentally while the protagonist is fully aware of the
inappropriateness of his or her behavior. Examples include
stumbling during a speech and slipping in the mud.
Accidental > Unaware (AU, 10 vignettes). Likewise, the
predicament occurs accidentally, but the protagonist does not
realize the mishap within that specific moment as the incident is
out of his or her attentional or perceptual focus. Examples include
walking around with the zipper open and, as exemplified in the
introduction, having toilet paper hanging out of the back pocket.
Intentional > Aware (IA, 10 vignettes). Here, the norm
violation is intentionally evoked, although the protagonist is well
aware that his/her behavior is inappropriate in the current
situation. Examples include belching aloud in a high-end
restaurant and throwing garbage on the street.
Intentional > Unaware (IU, 10 vignettes). Finally, certain
conventions are violated without the protagonist being aware
about the inappropriateness underlying that particular situation.
Examples include extensive self-praising in public speeches or
wearing a T-shirt with an imprint stating ‘I am sexy’.
After the vicarious embarrassment ratings, participants received
instructions for completing the E-Scale [27] (see File S2). The E-
scale measures individual difference in trait empathy with 25
items, representing a general empathy factor. The items cover
different empathic behaviors and participants rate how well these
behaviors apply to themselves on a scale from 1 (not at all)t o5( very
strong). It has been shown that the scale discriminates between the
two related sub-facets of ‘‘emotional’’ and ‘‘cognitive’’ empathy
[27]. In line with conceptualizations of trait empathy as a multi-
dimensional construct [27,28], the emotional facet of the E-Scale
describes individual differences in the experience of another’s
emotion, whereas the cognitive facet focuses on the mental act to
take another’s perspective. Example items include ‘‘I can easily
relate to the feelings of literary characters’’ (emotional empathy)
and ‘‘I sometimes try to better understand my friends by taking
their perspective’’ (cognitive empathy). The E-Scale shows good
convergent and discriminant validity as well as internal consistency
and re-test reliability [27]. In the present sample the overall E-
Scale (a=.91) as well as the emotional (a=.82) and cognitive
(a=.84) facets had high internal consistencies. At the end of the
questionnaire, socio-demographic variables were assessed. The
whole questionnaire took about 40 minutes to complete.
Data Analyses. Data were analyzed with PASW Statistics 18
(SPSS, 2009, Chicago, IL). Each participant’s ratings were
averaged across the situations in each category (AA, AU, IA,
IU, and Neut). Internal consistencies for the different vicarious
embarrassment situations were high (Cronbach’s a first-person
embarrassment: AA=.86; AU=.96; IA=.88; IU=.85; vicarious
embarrassment: AA=.93; AU=.93; IA=.89; IU=.90). Averaged
ratings (AA, AU, IA, and IU) were entered into a two-factorial
repeated-measures General Linear Model (GLM) with the factor
PERSPECTIVE (first-person embarrassment vs. vicarious
embarrassment) and the factor CATEGORY (the four levels of
different situations). Individual differences in empathy as measured
by the E-Scale were entered as a continuous factor that was
specified to interact with the other two factors. Three contrasts
comparing the AA situations with each of the other three
categories (1 -1 0 0; 1 0 -1 0; 1 0 0 -1) were implemented to test
the corresponding simple and interaction effects. Descriptions of
effect sizes are reported as partial eta-squares in case of significant
effects. Differences to neutral situations were tested separately for
each of the four categories with paired-sample t-tests in both
conditions. To further elucidate the effects of individual differences
in trait empathy on ratings of vicarious embarrassment and first-
person embarrassment, Pearson correlations were computed
separately for each category and the neutral situations.
Results
Results of the GLM showed a significant main effect of
CATEGORY, F(3, 1851) =47.61, p,.001, g
2=.072, but not of
PERSPECTIVE, F(1, 617) =2.03, p=.154, and a significant two-
way interaction between CATEGORY and PERSPECTIVE, F(3,
1851) =39.10, p,.001, g
2=.060 (all ps Greenhouse-Geisser
corrected for non-sphericity). More specifically, the contrasts of
AA vs. each of the other three categories revealed significant
effects (AA vs. AU: F(1, 617) =84.03, p,.001, g
2=.120; AA vs.
IA: F(1, 617) =77.98, p,.001, g
2=.112; AA vs. IU: F(1, 617) =
72.89, p,.001, g
2=.106). Importantly, the interaction of these
contrasts with PERSPECTIVE were all significant (AA vs. AU:
F(1, 617) =44.90, p,.001, g
2=.068; AA vs. IA: F(1, 617) =
78.47, p,.001, g
2=.113; AA vs. IU: F(1, 617) =86.11, p,.001,
g
2=.122). Mean ratings of vicarious embarrassment for each class
of situation were in the mid-range of the scale (see Table 1) and
highest ratings were found for AA vignettes (M=4.32, SD=1.55)
with continuously dropping magnitude toward IU (M=3.28,
SD=1.42). A similar rank order was found for first-person
embarrassment (M=5.90, SD=0.80 (AA); M=1.39, SD=0.60
(IU)), thus illustrating the main effect of CATEGORY found in
the GLM. The interaction between CATEGORY and PER-
SPECTIVE was predominantly due to differences of AA situations
from the other three categories (AU, IA, IU) as indicated by the
contrast analyses. For situations in which the protagonist was
aware of his or her accidental mishap (AA) attributed first-person
embarrassment was stronger than the self-reported vicarious
response of the participants (d=21.28). For the other three types
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 April 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 4 | e18675of situations the vicarious embarrassment experiences significantly
exceeded the first-person embarrassment as attributed to the
protagonist (d=1.00 to 1.73, with all lower bounds of the
confidence intervals exceeding d=0.80). Paired-sample t-tests
showed significant differences of each category (AA, AU, IA, IU)
from neutral situations for both levels at PERSPECTIVE, all
Ts(618) .14.73, p,.001. Table 1 summarizes the results for first-
person embarrassment as attributed to the protagonist and
vicarious embarrassment ratings as indicated by the ‘observing’
participants.
Individual differences in trait empathy had a significant impact
on ratings, F(1,617) =42.98, p,.001, g
2=.065. The interactions
of empathy with CATEGORY, F(3,1851) =8.09; p,.001;
g
2=.013 and PERSPECTIVE, F(1,617) =21.16, p,.001,
g
2=.033 were significant, but the three-way interaction between
CATEGORY, PERSPECTIVE, and trait empathy did not reach
significance, F(3,1851) =0.361, p=.746. To further examine the
interactions involving trait empathy, Table 2 provides correlation
coefficients of individual differences in trait empathy with first-
person embarrassment and vicarious embarrassment ratings.
Overall, empathy was positively related to ratings at both
perspectives, illustrating the main effect of the empathy in the
GLM. However, the strongest correlations emerged with vicarious
embarrassment ratings. Correlations were medium to small in size,
ranging from r=.20 to r=.24 (AA), r=.24 to r=.28 (AU), r=.19
to r=.23 (IA), and r=.13 to r=.16 (IU). Emotional and cognitive
facets of trait empathy showed similar associations with vicarious
embarrassment ratings (see Table 2). As indicated by the
significant interaction between PERSPECTIVE and empathy,
the ratings of first-person embarrassment as attributed to the
protagonist showed weaker associations with individual differences
in trait empathy. Significant correlations were found in AA
situations (ranging from r=.14 to r=.21) which together with the
vicarious embarrassment ratings in AA situation illustrated the
interaction of empathy with CATEGORY in the GLM. Ratings
for neutral scenarios did not substantially correlate with individual
differences in trait empathy (.05$ r $2 .08).
Discussion Study 1. Study 1, using written stimulus material
in a within-participants design, demonstrates that observers’ vicarious
embarrassment does not necessarily require observing embar-
rassment in others. Among the four categories of vicariously
embarrassing situations, only in AA situations did the emotional
reaction as attributed to the awkwardly behaving person exceed the
vicarious embarrassment experiences in observers. However,
following our prediction about the variety of situations eliciting
vicarious embarrassment, self-reported vicarious emotions
substantially outweighed the first-person embarrassment attributed
to the protagonist. This was shown in case of situations where the
protagonist was (physically) unaware of his/her violation of a social
etiquette (AU) or intentionally violated a social norm, whether aware
of that fact or not (IA and IU).
Further, individual differences in trait empathy were positively
correlated with vicarious embarrassment ratings across all
situations. The effects are notable for several reasons. First,
correlations of trait empathy were higher with vicarious
embarrassment ratings than with ratings of first-person embar-
rassment or in neutral situations. This indicates that the
association of trait empathy and vicarious embarrassment cannot
be explained by the attribution of embarrassment experiences to
others. In the present data this process might occur in situations
in which one observes embarrassment in others (AA), but it does
not generalize to situations where the protagonists themselves are
not aware about the embarrassing incident (AU, IA, IU). Second,
the correlations found in this study provide additional insight into
the conceptualization of empathy as a co-experience of an actor’s
personal state [27,28]. It is inherent in the concept that highly
empathic individuals are more strongly influenced by others’
distress and emotions in their personal experience than
individuals low in empathy (AA) [27]. However, to our
knowledge, this is the first study to show empirically that
vicarious social emotions, here embarrassment, are related to
individual differences in empathy without sharing an emotional
condition (AU, IA, IU).
Intriguing at first glance, this finding may be due to the fact that
taking the perspective and sharing of another person’s inner state
is influenced by additional information that is accessible to the
Table 1. Vicarious embarrassment and first-person embarrassment across categories (Study 1).
First-Person Embarrassment Vicarious Embarrassment 95% CI
M (SD) Median M (SD) Median d-value lower upper
AA 5.90 (0.80) 6.09 4.32 (1.55) 4.45 -1.28 -1.41 ; -1.15
AU 2.35 (1.56) 1.60 3.86 (1.46) 3.90 1.00 0.89 ; 1.11
IA 2.11 (0.94) 1.90 3.73 (1.38) 3.70 1.37 1.24 ; 1.51
IU 1.39 (0.60) 1.20 3.28 (1.42) 3.20 1.73 1.58 ; 1.89
Neutral 1.05 (0.14) 1.00 1.02 (0.08) 1.00 -0.26 -0.34 ; -0.18
Note. Responses were given on scales ranging from 1 (not at all)t o7( very strong). Positive d-Values indicate higher ratings under the vicarious embarrassment
condition. Situations are abbreviated based on the intentionality and the belief state of the observed protagonist in the vicarious embarrassing situation. AA =
Accidental > Aware, AU = Accidental > Unaware, IA = Intentional > Aware, IU = Intentional > Unaware.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018675.t001
Table 2. Correlations of first-person embarrassment and
vicarious embarrassment ratings with individual differences in
trait empathy (Study 1).
First-Person
Embarrassment Vicarious Embarrassment
AA AU IA IU Neut AA AU IA IU Neut
Empathy .19 .10 .10 .07 .02 .24 .28 .22 .16 -.05
Emotional .14 .06 .05 .04 .00 .20 .24 .19 .13 -.08
Cognitive .21 .14 .13 .08 .05 .23 .28 .23 .16 -.01
Note. N = 619. Statistically significant correlations at p,.001 are printed in bold.
AA = Accidental > Aware, AU = Accidental > Unaware, IA = Intentional >
Aware, IU = Intentional > Unaware, Neut = Neutral.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018675.t002
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state is thus egocentrically biased by one’s own stereotypes,
ideology, prior knowledge, and other idiosyncratic information
[24]. Even when people are fully aware that another’s perspective
differs from their egocentric assessment of the situation, it is one’s
own perspective that is thought to serve as an anchor. For
psychotherapists it is of high relevance to overcome this
egocentrism, however, this does not apply for spontaneous
reactions in everyday life situations as captured in the vicarious
embarrassment situations. Accordingly, a recent study showed that
vicarious embarrassment experiences increase when imagining
oneself in an observed embarrassing situation compared to being
the protagonist [29]. This reasoning explains why people
experience vicarious embarrassment for a protagonist who is
currently not experiencing embarrassment at his or hers own flaws
and why individual differences in trait empathy are positively
correlated with this experience. However, the observed correla-
tions were not very high. Thus, substantial unshared variance
indicates that other processes related to the idiosyncratic
evaluation of the situation are involved. This establishes vicarious
embarrassment as a concept that is clearly separate from classic
definitions of empathy and suggests the distinction of forms of
empathy that are more or less a co-experience of another’s
emotion, and forms of empathy that rather reflect the observer’s
evaluation of the situation in the social context.
Study 2: The Neural Correlates of Vicarious
Embarrassment and Their Link to Individual
Differences in Empathy
Extending Study 1, we hypothesized that the perception of
others’ flaws or norm violations results in activations in brain
regions commonly associated with empathic processes. Based on
research on empathy for pain and basic emotions we hypothesized
that vicarious embarrassment would result in stronger activations
in the anterior insula and the ACC as neural indicators for the
ongoing empathic process [13,17]. Moreover, if empathy is
considered crucial in conceptualizing vicarious embarrassment,
the anterior insula as well as the ACC should show strong
hemodynamic responses even for situations where the protagonist
does not experience any social emotion him-/herself (i.e. AU, IA,
IU). We expected that individual differences in trait empathy
would be positively related to the activation of these two structures
while observing vicariously embarrassing situations.
Methods
Ethics Statement. We confirm that the research has been
conducted in compliance with the appropriate ethical guidelines of
the American Psychological Association (APA). The study was
approved by the local ethics committee at the faculty of medicine,
Philipps-University Marburg. All subjects were written informed
about the background of the study and anonymity of data
collection. We confirm that we obtained informed written consent
from all participants involved in the study.
Participants and Data Acquisition. Thirty-two right-
handed subjects (Philipps-University Marburg undergraduate
students, 17 female, aged 20-28 years, M=22.81, SD=2.19)
participated in the fMRI study for payment. The inclusion criteria
were age (18-30 years) and absence of any psychiatric or
neurologic disorder according to ICD-10. All subjects were
native German speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. Participants were scanned at 3T (Siemens Trio, Erlangen)
with 36 near-axial slices and a distance factor of 10% providing
whole brain coverage. An echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence was
used for acquisition of 553 functional volumes during the
experiment (TR=2.2 s, TE=30 ms, flip angle=90u, slice
thickness=3 mm, FoV=192). After scanning, participants
completed the E-Scale (Cronbach’s a=.88) to measure
individual differences in trait empathy and were debriefed
afterwards.
Stimulus Material. The stimulus material consisted of a set
of 50 sketches which were drawn based on a subset of situations
that were examined in Study 1 (see Fig. 1; for detailed information
see File S3). Sketches were used in addition to written vignettes to
generate more potent stimuli for the fMRI experiment. For each
modeled category (i.e. AA, AU, IA, IU) as well as for the neutral
control situations ten sketches depicting a protagonist in a social
situation were used.
Functional MRI Paradigm. All sketches were presented for
12 s together with a two-sentence description of the situation
similar to Study 1. The text was presented in a black 24-point non-
serif font (Arial) on a white background in two to three rows below
the drawings. The stimulus presentation was followed by a blank
screen for 1 s and a subsequent rating period lasting 3 s. During
the rating period subjects were asked to indicate their level of
vicarious embarrassment experienced during the previous picture
story. Responses were indicated on a scale ranging from 1 (not at
all)t o5( very strong) using a button press of the right hand. A jittered
low-level baseline showing a fixation cross for an average of 8 s
was interleaved between the rating phase and the following trial.
Sketches were presented in a pseudo-randomized order, ensuring
that no type of situation was immediately repeated and all types of
situation appeared in equal numbers. The total experiment time
was 22.28 min. Stimuli were presented on an LCD screen with
Presentation 11.0 software package (Neurobehavioral Systems,
Albany, CA, USA, http://www.neurobs.com/). Prior to the
experiment participants received careful instructions about the
experimental procedure outside the scanner using two example
situations that were not displayed during the fMRI session.
Functional MRI Data Analysis. FMRI data were analyzed
using SPM8 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The first four volumes
(dummy images) of the session were discarded from further
analyses. The remaining 549 EPI volumes were motion-corrected
and spatially normalized to the standard template of the Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI). The normalized volumes were
resliced with a voxel size of 26262 mm, smoothed with an
8 mm full-width half-maximum isotropic Gaussian kernel and
high-pass filtered at 1/256 Hz to remove low frequency drifts.
Statistical analysis was performed in a two-level, mixed-effects
procedure. The fixed-effects GLM on the first level included six
epoch regressors modeling hemodynamic responses to the
vicariously embarrassing situations (4), neutral situations (1), and
rating phase (1) with the abovementioned stimulus durations. The
vicarious embarrassment ratings after each situation were entered
as parametric modulators to explain additional variance in neural
activation due to differences in emotional responses on the within-
subject level. Six additional regressors modeling head movement
parameters were introduced to account for noise. Individually
weighted ß-maps of activation differences between the vicarious
embarrassment and the neutral situations were analyzed on the
second level.
The second-level analysis of activation differences was conduct-
ed with a full factorial random-effects GLM. The GLM contained
one factor with the four dependent levels of vicarious embarrass-
ment situations. The analysis of activation differences between
vicariously embarrassing and neutral situations was controlled for
individual differences in vicarious embarrassment experiences
during the fMRI session by introducing subjects’ averaged ratings
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following analysis, brain regions with strongest associations with
the different types of vicariously embarrassing situations were
identified through a conjunction analysis of the contrasts of
vicarious embarrassment compared to neutral situations (AA .
Neutr > AU . Neutr > IA . Neutr > IU . Neutr). The result
of the conjunction-analysis was thresholded at p,.05 applying
family-wise error (FWE) correction for whole brain analysis. All
results are reported in MNI space.
Correlations with Individual Differences in Trait
Empathy. To minimize circularity of the analyses estimates of
brain activation were extracted independent of individual
differences in trait empathy. First, functional regions-of-interest
(ROIs) were constructed for the ACC and anterior insula. To
achieve best estimates of the areas activated in vicariously
embarrassment situations, the results of the conjunction analysis
were thresholded at p,.001, uncorrected (see Figure 2A, blue and
pink areas). To verify that the functional ROIs still correspond to
the anatomical structures, these results were constrained by
anatomical masks covering the insula and the middle/anterior
cingulate cortex. The anatomical masks were created according to
the anatomical labeling atlas implemented in the WFU-PickAtlas
(Version 2.4) applying a dilation factor of one. Second, the
averages of parameter estimates in the functionally and
anatomically constrained clusters were computed for each
individual. The resulting parameters for blood oxygenation level
dependent (BOLD) responses in the ACC and the left insula were
then entered into a repeated-measures GLM. The repeated factor
CATEGORY covered the four levels of vicariously embarrassing
situations, and individual differences in empathy were entered as a
continuous factor. To further elucidate the effects of individual
differences in trait empathy on ratings of vicarious embarrassment
correlations were computed separately for each category and the
emotional and cognitive subfacets of the E-scale.
Results
Behavioral Data. The behavioral data of the fMRI study
confirmed the findings of Study 1. As expected, participants rated
their vicarious embarrassment significantly stronger during AA,
AU, IA and IU situations compared to the neutral scenarios,
Ts(31) .12.87, ps,.001. Vicarious embarrassment ratings were
around the scale mean with M=2.46, SD=0.64 (IU), M=2.86,
SD=0.71 (IA), M=3.21; SD=0.79 (AU), and M=3.50; SD=0.70
(AA). Further, averaged vicarious embarrassment ratings differed
significantly across the four modeled situations, Ts(31) .3.2,
ps,.003.
Compared to the neutral situations (M=786 ms, SD=158 ms)
participants had longer response times for their ratings after
vicarious embarrassment situations (ranging from M=995 ms,
SD=332 ms (IU) to M=1039 ms, SD=312 ms (AA); ts(31)
.3.89, ps,.001). Reaction times did not significantly differ among
the four types of situations, Ts(31) ,1.71, ps..097. Pearson
correlations of individual differences in trait empathy with
vicarious embarrassment ratings were in a similar range as in
Study 1 ranging from r=.17 (IA) to r=.32 (AA). However, at this
sample size, trait empathy was only correlated significantly with
ratings in AA situations (p=.036), not the other three situations
(AU, IA, IU, ps..051).
Neuroimaging Data. As predicted, the conjunction analysis
revealed BOLD responses in brain areas typically involved in
empathic processing to be significantly stronger for vicarious
embarrassment situations than for neutral situations, p,.05,
corrected (see Figure 2, Table 3). The activation of both the left
ACC (26 20 44) and the left anterior insula (-32 24 0) showed
considerable overlap with the affective-motivational part of the
‘pain matrix’ [9,20]. Furthermore we observed stronger responses
in the thalamus, periaqueductal grey (PAG) in the brainstem, and
the cerebellum, structures that are frequently associated with the
empathic perceptions of others’ pain [18].
Figure 1. Examples of the stimulus material applied in the fMRI study. Drawn sketches depict a protagonist, indicated by the red arrow
above his/her head, in possibly embarrassing situations. During the fMRI experiment each sketch was accompanied by a sentence introducing the
current scenario. Situations were presented with the following textual vignettes for clarification: AA: You are at a post-office: the trousers of a person
in front of you rip as he bends down to lift a package…; AU: You are in a library: the person in front of you wears her pants in a way that you can see
her slip…; IA: You are at a cinema: during the movie a person in the front row is talking on his mobile…; IU: You are in a pedestrian zone: a young
man wearing a VIP-necklet passes by…; N: You are in a library: a woman is borrowing a book at the reception desk…
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018675.g001
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insula as dependent variables did not show significant effects of
CATEGORY (ACC: F(3,90) =1.66; p=.181; anterior insula:
F(3,90) =2.69; p=.061, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). This was
expected since the parameter estimates were extracted in regions
showing the strongest activation in the conjunction analysis across
the four situations. However, individual differences in trait
empathy were significant predictors of the neural activation in
both regions (ACC: F(1,30) =10.01, p,.005, g
2=.250, anterior
insula: F(1,30) =7.04, p,.013, g
2=.190). The interaction of
empathy with CATEGORY was non-significant for both the
ACC and anterior insula indicating similar correlations of trait
empathy with neural activation across all modeled situations
(ACC: F(3,90) =1.59, p=.206; anterior insula: F(3,90) =2.69,
p=.061). Further examination of the main effects found in the
GLM indicated that BOLD responses of the anterior insula and
the ACC were positively correlated with individual differences in
trait empathy (see Table 4). Across the four types of situations the
correlations of BOLD responses in the ACC with individual
differences in trait empathy represented medium to large effects,
varying from r=.33, p=.069 (AA) to r=.49, p,.002 (IA).
Correlations with the subfacets emotional and cognitive empathy
were in a similar range from r=.29, p=.111 (IA) to r=.49,
p,.005 (IU). BOLD response of the left anterior insula showed
similar correlations with individual differences in trait empathy
ranging from r=.28, p,.121 (AA) to r=.50, p,.004 (IU) and
correlations with the emotional and cognitive subfacets of
empathy were between, r=.19, p=.302 (AU) and r=.52,
p,.002 (IU).
Participants’ ratings of vicarious embarrassment experiences in
each category showed positive associations with the neural
activation, but these were statistically significant only for the left
anterior insula. Correlations ranged from r=.26, p=.157 (IU) to
r=.47, p,.006 (AU) in the anterior insula and from r=.20,
p=.282 (AA) to r=.28, p=.126 (IA) in the ACC (see Table 4).
Discussion Study 2. The results of the fMRI study
demonstrated that the observation of vicarious embarrassment
situations elicit cortical activations in areas constituting the
affective component of the pain matrix: the ACC and the left
Figure 2. Neural activation and average parameter estimates during vicarious embarrassment. A Activations in response to vicarious
embarrassing situations within the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and left anterior insula. The rendered image displays the results of a random-
effects analysis contrasting vicarious embarrassing with neutral situations. Positive effects of a conjunction analysis (AA . N > AU . N > IA . N > IU
. N) thresholded at p,.05, FWE-corrected (red and pink areas) are superimposed on the regions-of-interests which were generated in the ACC and
the anterior insula at a more liberal threshold, p,.001, uncorrected (blue and pink areas). B Average parameter estimates within the ACC and the left
anterior insula masks during the processing of vicarious embarrassing (AA, AU, IA, IU) and neutral situations (NEUT).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018675.g002
Table 3. Common neural activations in response to vicarious
embarrassing situations (Study 2).
Side
MNI
Coordinates
Cluste
Size T p,
xy z
Anterior Cingulate Cortex L -6 20 44 395 6.75 .001
L -4 14 54 5.99
L -10 28 28 5.66
Anterior Insula L -32 24 0 62 5.66 .001
L -36 22 -16 4.19
L -48 30 10 3.47
Thalamus L -4 -6 6 23 5.33 .005
Cerebellum R 30 -68 -28 5 4.98 .022
PAG L -2 -20 -22 1 4.84 .038
Note. p-values are reported at cluster-level and corrected for multiple
comparisons in whole-brain analyses (FWE). Coordinates represent peak
activations within a cluster. PAG = periaqueductal grey.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018675.t003
Table 4. Correlations of average parameter estimates within
the ACC and the left anterior insula with individual differences
in trait empathy and vicarious embarrassment ratings.
ACC Left Anterior Insula
AA AU IA IU AA AU IA IU
Empathy .33 .48 .49 .49 .28 .33 .49 .50
Emotional .29 .37 .49 .41 .21 .19 .47 .40
Cognitive .30 .48 .48 .48 .33 .42 .49 .52
Ratings .20 .21 .28 .23 .45 .47 .33 .26
Note. Correlations significant at p,.05 are printed in bold. ACC = Anterior
Cingulate Cortex. AA = Accidental > Aware, AU = Accidental > Unaware, IA
= Intentional > Aware, IU = Intentional > Unaware.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018675.t004
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consistently high along a broad range of different situations and
was even observed for situations which depicted the protagonist
being unaware about the inappropriateness of the situation or
intentionally violates social norms (AU, IA, and IU). Additionally,
individual differences in vicarious embarrassment experiences
during the fMRI session were positively correlated with the neural
responses in the anterior insula.
Recent fMRI studies could show that the neural response to
another person’s physical pain was modulated by the observer’s
appraisals due to prior interactions with a protagonist [31] or own
professional experience [32]. It was further demonstrated that even
when observing photographs that display usually painful needle
injectionstoananesthetizedhand,observersactivatesimilarcortical
areas [15]. In this line, the results of the present fMRI experiment
show that in the absence of another’s embarrassment observers
generate vicarious emotions based on their own appraisals. These
appraisals depend on egocentric evaluations influenced by own
stereotypes, attitudes, or assumptions about what is appropriate in a
given social context. However, the correlations of individual
differences in trait empathy with neural activation in the ACC
and the anterior insula suggest that these appraisals are nevertheless
embedded in processes of empathic perspective taking. Thus,
vicarious embarrassment might in part result from the projection of
oneself into the shoes of others observed in an inappropriate
condition [24]. An analogy for perceiving potentially painful
situations in others would be, for example, observing protagonists
intentionally harming themselves (i.e. masochists; a suggestion
brought forward by Lieberman [33]) or accidentally injuring
themselves while not being aware of this fact (i.e. a paraplegic
person clamping his or her feet in the wheelchair).
Discussion
Worldwide millions of people gather in groups to watch
television shows such as ‘‘Pop Idol’’ (United Kingdom), ‘‘Amer-
ica’s Next Top Model’’ (United States), ‘‘Deutschland sucht den
Superstar’’ (Germany), ‘‘Nouvelle Star’’ (France), or ‘‘Super Girl’’
(China) and collectively enjoy witnessing plights or mishaps
happening to the candidates, and perceive ‘‘vicarious embarrass-
ment’’, ‘‘Fremdscham’’, or ‘‘embarrassment-by-proxy’’. The appeal
of observing others’ plights exploited via television or internet
seems to be present regardless of whether the person in focus
realizes the mishap (e.g., tripping, as ‘‘America’s Next Top
Model’’) or not (e.g., singing with a bad voice, as a German
‘‘Superstar’’). Although the effect of laughing about others’
misfortunes has always been picked up in theater plays and
comedy movies (e.g., early slapstick comedians such as Charlie
Chaplin, Buster Keaton, or Laurel & Hardy exactly utilized this
type of humor), today’s media increasingly focuses on these
everyday situations not only to laugh about but to feel with and for
others to the entertainment of millions of spectators.
Current scientific approaches aiming to unravel the neuro-
cognitive underpinnings of empathy for others’ predicaments focus
on the observation of physically painful scenarios, such as cutting
one’s fingers while cooking [10,15,18,30]. Only recently, Yang
and co-workers have demonstrated that the same cortical network
implicated in empathically feeling (physical) pain is also involved in
processes of compassion for others’ social pain (i.e. states of social
rejection [19]).
With the present study we extended these previous findings by
showingthat empathyforothers’(social)pain– hereembarrassment
– is experienced in a broad range of different social situations and
that inter-individual differences in empathy modulate the vicarious
experience of embarrassment. Furthermore, we uncovered the
neural correlates of the social emotion vicariousembarrassment and
highlighted its link to individual differences in trait empathy.
We proposed the two orthogonal dimensions of ‘‘intentionality’’
and ‘‘awareness’’, as attributed to the observed protagonist’s actions,
to classify situations into four distinctive categories. Using
multimodal (written and pictorial) stimulus material we highlight-
ed the importance of this approach for the understanding of the
concept of vicarious embarrassment and its consequences. We
consider two aspects as most relevant for the validity of the
proposed dimensional structure. First, the relationship between
first-person embarrassment and experienced vicarious embarrass-
ment depends on situational characteristics; and second, behav-
ioral as well as functional activity measures were found to correlate
with individual differences in empathy.
With respect to first-person embarrassment in others, appease-
ment gestures are reasonably easy to decode via nonverbal
channels. For example, controlled smiles, averted gaze, head
movements down and away, lowered head, downcast eyes,
diminished posture, and blushing have been proposed to constitute
universally recognized gestures [1,34,35,36,37,38]. Such gestures
serve as a signal from empathic observers that the plight they have
witnessed is an exceptional occurrence for the protagonist. This
suggests that the apparent experience of embarrassment following
a public blunder serves a social function. It reassures the observer
that the protagonist recognizes that some etiquette has been
violated, and it may therefore lead observers to view the
protagonist more positively than would otherwise be the case
[39,40]. However, with the presented data we show that these
appeasement gestures do only partly (i.e. during AA situations)
help to explain how empathic observers experience embarrass-
ment for others’ flaws or mishaps. We demonstrated that (i) even
for situations in which protagonists are unaware of the
embarrassing situation (AU) and protagonists behave intentionally
(IA, IU), empathic observers nevertheless experience vicarious
embarrassment; (ii) the level of individual differences in trait
empathy is correlated with this experience; and (iii) the affective
components of the ’pain matrix’ are involved in this process. As
noted by Tangney et al. [41], vicarious forms of social emotions
substantially help to integrate social psychological research on
interpersonal relations, social identity, group, and inter-group
processes with cognitive and affective research.
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